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FORMS OF EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION
MARIO P. CHITI*
I
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the various forms of European administration and their
associated administrative law systems. From the outset, it should be understood that
the expression “European administration” is not used here (as it usually is ) to refer to
the complex of government bodies exercising administrative powers in the European
Community (EC, or “Community”) (such as the European Commission, European
agencies, and all other official bodies). Rather, the expression here is used to refer to
the combination of Community public powers and national administrations
responsible for implementing Community measures and operating as decentralized,
Community government bodies. Together, the two constitute “the common
administration of the European order,”1 marked by common, Community-made
interests and shared substantive and procedural legal principles.
So far, the notion of “common administration” has been used by certain scholars
to explain the special relationship in European governance among all of the different
public administrations, both vertically (that is, the relationships between the Member
States and Community bodies, such as the Commission), and horizontally (that is, the
relationships among the Member States), and to understand the phenomenon of
European administrative networks. The notion is now spreading from “legal science”
(that is, legal scholarship) to statutory law, as evidenced by various regulations and
directives, and now also by the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe
(hereinafter “Constitutional Treaty”). In fact, in the Constitutional Treaty, the
structure and functions of both European and national public administration are
addressed, and the goal of effective implementation and administration of Community
law is identified as a “matter of common interest.”2
This clarification of the meaning of European administration lays the groundwork
for the central thesis of this Article: in the Community, we face the rise of a multilevel public administration in which the original Community scheme of the indirect,
autonomous execution of Community policies by national administrations is being
replaced by an administrative model of integration based on the criteria of flexibility
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2. See TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, art. III-285, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 3.
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and differentiation. By now, the model of polycentric public administration is
standard in national systems, and it is gradually becoming so in Europe’s
supranational system of governance.3 Europe’s legal order contains a variety of
principles capable of disciplining the new multi-level public administration that may
be said to substitute an “administrative law of integration.” This thesis seems
contrary, however, to the prevailing academic view:
[W]hat is lacking—and unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future—is a coherent body of
law structuring the practices of multi-level co-operation between European, national and
hybrid authorities, as well as complex networks of governance; that is a body of law
structuring exactly the type of activities that characterize so much of the European multi4
level system of governance.

The Constitutional Treaty affirms the existence of a developed law adapted to the
politics of Community administration. Even though the Constitutional Treaty has yet
to be signed and ratified, the origins of the Convention, the inclusive nature of the
drafting process, and the prestige of the members of the Convention all suggest that
the provisions regarding public administration, even without signature and ratification,
have already become part of the acquis communautaire (the complete body of
Community laws that Member States must respect).
This Article proceeds in three parts: Part II recounts the history of administration
and of administrative law in the European Community; Part III examines the main
types of administrative action in the Community; and Part IV highlights the novel
elements and the shortcomings of European administrative law today. Part V
concludes with a look at the current limits of European administrative law.
II
THE HISTORY OF ADMINISTRATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
A. The “Administrative Atmosphere” of the European Coal and Steel Community
European integration began in 1951 with the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC). The ECSC was an essentially administrative organization—a variant, albeit
with additional supranational features, of the different international administrative
organizations dating to the second half of the 1800s.5 In Carl Friedrich Ophuls’
understanding in Les Réglements et les directives dans les Traités de Rome, the
substantive goals and the organization of the ECSC operated in an “administrative

3. For a partly different opinion on the multi-level character as a distinctive feature of European
administrative law, see Sabino Cassese, Il diritto amministrativo presenta caratteri originali?, in RIV. TRIM.
DIR. PUBBL. 35, 51 (2003).
4. Christian Joerges, The Law’s Problems with the Governance of the European Market, in GOOD
GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET 10 (Christian Joerges and Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002)
(summarizing another paper in the same volume, which Joerges believes is excessively pessimistic).
5. Cf. STEFANO BATTINI, AMMINISTRAZIONI SENZA STATO PROFILI DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO
INTERNAZIONALE (2003).
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atmosphere.”6 The policy aims, derived from national imperatives of restructuring the
coal and steel industries; the organization in which the supranational, technocratic and
expert High Authority was given a pivotal role; and the types of legal acts anticipated
in the ECSC Treaty, all contributed to the “administrative atmosphere” of the early
days of European integration. In addition, the administrative legal systems of the six
founding Member States were quite similar, also facilitating the exercise of
administrative power in the new Community.7
Judicial and scholarly attention to administrative action and law, including the
influence of national legal principles on Community law, came naturally in this
historical context. Evidence of this interest can be found in the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice of the 1950s and in the numerous studies of European legal
scholars dedicated to the ECSC.
Regarding the jurisprudence, in the early period the Court of Justice handed down
a number of fundamental judgements on the character of the Community
administration and administrative decisionmaking. The most famous and commonly
cited of these judgments were Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique, on misuse of
powers;8 Algera,9 concerning revocation of administrative acts; Lachmueller,10 on the
application of the general rules of administrative law to the activity of the linguistic
service of the Commission; and Giuffrida,11 concerning abuse of procedure.
In these decisions, the Court of Justice declared the contested Community
measures to be administrative acts governed by legal principles—in the absence of a
complete and comprehensive Community legal framework—derived from national
administrative law, and in particular French administrative law, which had a special
influence over that stage of European integration. Thus the frequent recourse in the
Court of Justice’s case law to the terminology and concepts of legal orders “with an
administrative regime”—in other words, legal systems in the French administrative
law tradition (droit administratif). These concepts include the presumption of validity
of administrative acts, the enumeration and typology of grounds on which
administrative acts can be held to be illegal, the difference between the non-existence
and the nullity of administrative acts (if the legal defect is so grave as to render the act
“nonexistent,” the usual statutes of limitation on bringing a challenge do not apply and
the court’s decision striking the act has retroactive effect), the conditions for and
consequences of the revocation of administrative acts, and so on.12

6. Carl Friedrich Ophuls, Les Réglements et les directives dans les Traités de Rome, in C.D.E. 3, 10
(1966).
7. See Jean Rivero, Le problème de l’influence des droits internes sur la Cour de Justice de la CECA, in
A.F.D.I. 295 (1958).
8. Case 8/55, Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v. High Authority, 1954-56 E.C.R. 245.
9. Joined cases 7/56 & 3-7/57, Algera v. Common Assembly, 1957 E.C.R. 39.
10. Joined cases 43/59, 45/59, & 48/59, Von Lachmuiller v. Commission, 1960 E.C.R. 983.
11. Case 105/75, Giuffrida v. Council of the European Communities, 1976 E.C.R. 1395.
12. See Giandomenico Falcon, Dal diritto amministrativo nazionale al diritto amministrativo europeo, in
RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO 351 (1991) (underlining the importance of the use
made of these notions).
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Connected to the sophisticated and extensive jurisprudence of the Court of Justice
was the attention of European administrative legal science to the ECSC. Well known
are the French and German contributions (besides the work of Rivero,13 the studies by
De Laubadère,14 Lorenz,15 and Ipsen16 merit mention). Less renowned are the Italian
studies—unfairly so, since some of them made seminal contributions to the legal
conceptualization of the administrative acts of the ECSC (and then of the European
Economic Community (EEC)) and discerned, ahead of their time and well before the
Court of Justice reached the same conclusion, that a number of elements of the
Community legal experience were entirely novel and that the Community legal order
was sui generis.17
The lively scientific interest in the administrative aspects of the Communities in
the first stage of the European integration was followed by a long period of near
oblivion in Italy and Europe generally. Only in the late 1980s was interest in
European administrative law revived. This renaissance of academic interest, however,
was spurred by transformations in the EC, especially after the expansion of policy
areas in the Single European Act of 1986 (ESA), and was almost completely
uninfluenced by the virtually forgotten ECSC experience.
B. The Passage to the “Constitutional Atmosphere” of the EEC and the
Establishment of the “Vulgate” on the Character of the Community
The vanishing of the initial Community “administrative atmosphere” was
connected partly to the difference in the institutional model of the EEC as compared to
the earlier ECSC, and partly to the emergence of an interpretive “vulgate”18 on the
constitutional roots of the Community, which tended to marginalize the administrative
aspects.
As for the former—the differences between the EEC and ECSC institutional
models—the passage to the “constitutional atmosphere” of the 1960s is due to a
number of factors. Going back to the original 1957 text, the EEC Treaty—in contrast
with the treaties establishing the international, administrative organizations of the
time—is marked by a set of wide-ranging aims and the conferral of significant
freedom and powers to Community bodies in achieving those aims. Certain
Community institutions, such as the Commission and the Court of Justice, exhibit

13. See Rivero, supra note 7.
14. Hans Köln, Les actes administratifs, in DIX ANS DE JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR DE JUSTICE DES
COMMUNAUTES EUROPENNES 472 (1965).
15. General Principles of Law: Their Elaboration in the Court of Justice of the EC, in A.J.C.L. 1 (1964).
16. Tubingen, EUROPAISCHES GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT (1972).
17. The “Community period” of the Italian science of administrative law is, marked by the studies of
Gasparri on review of the excess of power in the ECSC (1957); of Vitta on the executive bodies of the ECSC
(1960); of Monaco on the administrative organization of the European Communities (1961); of Benvenuti on
the ECSC as an administrative organization (1961); of De Vergottini on the different types of general, legal acts
and administrative measures in the European Communities (1963); of Sacchi Morsiani on the administrative
power of the European Communities (1965-70); and of Jaccarino on the acts of the European Communities
(1970).
18. The expression is taken from Renaud Dehousse, Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European
Governance, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET, supra note 4, at 207.
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unprecedented supranational features. The system of government operates according
to an institutional balance and a complex architecture in which lawmaking and
administrative functions are intentionally blurred. The Court of Justice, in its case
law, characterized the Community legal system as distinct from the existing
archetypes of both national and international law, since individuals as well as States
were governed by and subject to the system of rights and duties. The Court, as one
observer astutely put it, turns out to be the “federal virus” that has since grown into a
full-fledged European constitutional order.19
These characteristics of the EEC gave rise to the EEC’s interpretation—soon
accepted as the “vulgate”—as an essentially constitutional organization whose
principal mission was to craft and promulgate norms and regulations. According to
the vulgate, the execution of the rules was peripheral to the mission of the Community
institutions, which preferred to entrust such tasks to the Member States’
administrations, according to the model of indirect execution.
Both the case law and the legal science thus focused on identifying and
understanding the novelties of the Community legal system, usually defined as the
“constitutional” elements of the EEC.
Few bothered to study Community
administration and the relations among Community and national administrative
bodies. Indeed, given the reliance on indirect implementation by the Member States,
many denied that a distinct Community administration, with a distinct European
administrative law existed.
The scholarly fascination with the constitutional characteristics of the Community
legal order—extraordinary compared to previous international experiences—was
justified, but this vulgate concealed the equally important administrative reality of the
Community. This reality, however, has gradually resurfaced as a consequence of
three factors: first, the decline of indirect execution—vested in each of the Member
States acting alone—and the rise of coordinated administrative action, involving both
Community institutions and the Member States; second, the rapid expansion in
Community policies and powers, with the associated need to develop an
administrative apparatus capable of implementing such policies; and third, the
growing resort to direct enforcement of Community law, against both individuals and
firms.20
Some of these developments were inherent in the “constitutional” jurisprudence of
the Court of Justice, namely the revolutionary holding that individuals were directly
vested with rights and duties under the Treaty, rather than through the intermediary of
the state (as under classical international law).21 These Treaty-based rights and
obligations applied regardless of whether they were constitutional or administrative.
Other developments were connected to case law both concerning the direct effect of
the Treaties (and the measures passed pursuant to the Treaties) and concerning state

19. Giuliano Amato, Verso la Costituzione europea, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO
supra note 12, at 291.
20. For a systematic exam of the various interactions, see EDOARDO CHITI & CLAUDIO FRANCHINI,
L’INTEGRAZIONE AMMINISTRATIVA EUROPEA (2003).
21. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
COMUNITARIO,
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liability for infringement of Community obligations. Both were legal techniques
originally conceived for the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of Community law,
but also entailing a number of consequences for the individual’s relationship with the
Community authorities and national administrative bodies responsible for the
enforcement of Community law.
The revival of attention to Community
administrative law is also associated with new areas of Community policy that entail
the provision of services and the distribution of benefits (for instance, the policies
under the Community “Social Agenda”), entrusted under the most recent law to
Community institutions, and closely resembling classic forms of social welfare
administration in the Member States.
C. The Institutional Balance of the Community and the Lack of a Constitutional
Basis for Administration
The recognition of the empirical phenomenon of Community administrative
action—and hence the limits of the “vulgate” on the nature of the European legal
order—has highlighted the numerous gaps in both primary and secondary Community
law as well as the absence of a theoretical framework capable of providing a sound
legal basis for European administrative action. While the lacunae left by written
Community law can be filled relatively easily (demonstrated by the most recent
Community legislation to be considered later), working out a conceptual
reconstruction of Community administrative action, new in many respects compared
to classic administration, is more complete. In fact, it is extremely difficult to identify
a set of common legal principles that underlie the different administrative law
traditions of the Member States, even more so than for constitutional law. Indeed,
talking about “common administrative values” shared by all Member States is
historically artificial. As we all know, national administrative experiences, even in
continental Europe, are quite different. The legal doctrine of and scholarship on
Community administrative law within the last decades has drawn more on the
comparative law techniques of imitating particular national systems and developing
hybrids of different systems than on expressing a new common administrative law that
can be found, through rational scientific inquiry, in the laws of all the Member States.
Some of the most troubling shortcomings of Community administrative law are
related to the absence of a clear constitutional basis for public administration and the
lack of a distinction between the primary, lawmaking activity of the Community, and
the secondary, administrative lawmaking and enforcement activity of the Community.
Moreover, certain features of Community administration make the construction of a
principled, legal framework especially difficult: the prevalence of regulation over the
provision of services and benefits and other classic forms of administrative action—a
balance quite foreign to the experience of the Member States—and the establishment
of an original, unprecedented form of administrative organization, namely, mixed
administration.
These problems, however, are gradually being addressed, even setting aside for
the moment the Constitutional Treaty. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice clarified
certain important points, such as the question of subsidiarity and proportionality, thus
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requiring the Community to balance the need for uniform implementation against the
national interest in autonomy and discretion, and on the forms of protection. The
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, albeit still lacking formal legal
force, provides for the principle of good administration,22 and the right of access to the
documents of the institutions.
Community law of the past decade has also paid greater attention to the legal
principles that should govern the implementation of Community laws, as
demonstrated by numerous regulations and directives, both sectoral and general. The
European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance are also, through an extensive
jurisprudence, identifying different types of Community administrative acts, their
relationship to other forms of Community acts, and the grounds and circumstances
under which the Court will hold them to be unlawful.
D. The Proposal for a Constitutional Treaty and the New Constitutional Basis of
European Administration
The Constitutional Treaty, approved in July 2003 by the European Convention,
dedicates significant space to the issues of public administration and sets down a
series of new general principles directly relevant to public administration, especially
on the issues of allocation of powers between Europe and the Member States, and on
different types of European legal acts. If the Constitutional Treaty is ratified in its
current form, European administration will have a solid constitutional basis.
The new framework for legal acts under article I-33 provides for “legislative” and
“administrative” acts. Within the administrative category, it identifies four types:
European regulations, European decisions, recommendations and opinions. When and
if this text is ratified, the challenge will be to identify existing and future types of
administrative acts, and to find the criteria to determine what should be considered a
regulation, decision, recommendation, or opinion. Article I-37 reaffirms the
distinction between legislative and administrative measures. It sets down the
principles that should govern the “implementing acts” of both the Union and the
Member States when giving effect to European laws and other measures. For the first
time, implementation is clearly set off from the other public activities of the Union.
This represents a significant transformation of constitutional order, from the current
“confusion” of powers, to a clear division of legislative and administrative functions.
The new text on competences also constitutes a turning point in the Community
legal tradition. The original EC Treaty and all the subsequent Treaties were based on
a dynamic and flexible model centred on the “policies” and “objectives” to be
pursued; principles that should protect the powers of the Member States as well as
those of the Community, such as competence, were taboos. In contrast, the
Constitutional Treaty allocates five types of competence to the Union, including one

22. Under Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Charter—now inserted in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe—the right to a good administration includes: the right of every person to be heard before any
individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken; the right of every person to have access to
his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business
secrecy; and the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.
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that is directly relevant to administration—the competence allowing the Union to
support, co-ordinate and complement policies of the Member States (article I-17). But
a word of caution before concluding that Europe’s first Constitution is typical of
national federal orders: the new European system of competences still allows for
greater flexibility than national constitutions and is conceived, above all, as a mode of
integrating and combining the different levels of government rather than of separating
and checking public power.
A number of constitutional provisions would expand European competences in the
administrative arena. Among these figure article III-285 concerning “administrative
co-operation” and part of the chapter dedicated to the sectors in which the Union may
take co-ordinating, complementary or supporting action. Under article III-285, the
“effective national implementation of Union law by the Member States, which is
essential for the proper functioning of the Union, shall be regarded as a matter of
common interest.” Consequently, the Union would acquire the power to promote
various initiatives with the aim of supporting and co-ordinating implementation—
without prejudice, however, to the existing duties of the Member States to implement
Union law.
Article I-37 requires Member States to adopt all national measures necessary to
implement European acts. It also improves the powers of Member States: Article I-37
requires that European laws lay down mechanisms in advance, through which
Member States can monitor and control implementing acts. While the first part is
already implicitly guaranteed under the duty of sincere co-operation in Article 10 of
the EC Treaty, the second is completely new. In sum, problems of administrative
integration, both vertical and horizontal, are clearly a matter of concern in the
Constitutional Treaty.
III
THE VARIOUS FORMS OF COMMUNITY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
A. Regulation
The best-known type of Community administrative action, long considered the
only type, is regulation.23 In national administrative law, the notion of regulation
covers the different public measures used to regulate economic activities and the
market. It is not easy to translate directly the notion into Community law, because
until now the Community has not made a clear-cut distinction between law and
administration. For this very reason, one commentator has called Community
governance a form of “political administration,”24 that is, an unprecedented form of

23. I here refer to the allocation of functions proposed by DOMENICO SORACE, DIRITTO DELLE
PUBBLICHE AMMINISTRAZIONI 71 (2003), which, with the limits explained in the text, can be applied also to
the Community system.
24. Christian Joerges, Good Governance through Comitology?, in EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL
REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS 309, 322 (Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos eds., 1999).
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public power concerned with settling fundamental questions of risk administration and
market order, rather than the mere regulation of market dynamics.
However, Community law has progressively defined the regulatory power with
regard to administration and has as well “transplanted” typically national
administrative powers, such as imperatività (executory capacity of administrative
measures). More generally, an examination of Community regulatory power shows
that in the Community system, public administration is also in a position of legal
supremacy analogous to that of public administration in the national systems with
administrative regimes.
A number of significant differences separate regulation at the Community level
from national regulation, albeit less marked than in the early days of European
integration. At the Community level, regulatory schemes make less use of command
and control techniques (such as permits and licenses), and greater use of incentives
(such as grants and awards). Community regulation also relies more heavily than
national regulation on plans and programs, the details of which are to be filled in by
local authorities.
Yet change is afoot. The old regulatory technique of Community plans and
programs and national implementation—or in other words, of indirect execution—is
gradually being replaced with the technique of joint implementation (sometimes
defined also as mixed or composite) involving both the Community and the Member
States. The new principle of “acting together” entails a complex sequence of
Community and national determinations in a single administrative proceeding—which
sometimes is initiated at the national level, other times at the Community level—and
can involve consideration and reconsideration of the very same matter in the two
spheres.
The legal consequences of joint implementation are manifold. National
administrative law has come under much greater pressure to conform with general
principles of Community law because of the need to guarantee efficiency and
uniformity in such proceedings. Furthermore, the procedure and organization of
national administrative bodies involved in joint proceedings must be modified to
comply with requirements set down in Community law. The co-optation of national
administrative agencies obviates the need to expand the core civil service at the
European level. We are witnessing a rise in the number of European agencies, an
atypical body well-suited to the needs of join administration, and heavier reliance on
advisory committees composed of interest group representatives and national
technical experts. Last, this form of administration has contributed to a thicker set of
both vertical relations between Community and national administrations, and
horizontal relations among the different national administrations responsible for the
enforcement of Community law in their territories.
B. The Provision of Services
Recently, the Community has also gotten into the administrative business of
providing services, a form of administrative activity well known in national
administrative law. This development is a consequence of the evolution of the EC
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from an organization aimed at the establishment of a common market into a fullfledged political community that includes among its citizens individuals in need of
public services. The impetus to expand Europe’s administrative mission began with
the “constitutional” jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in the 1960s—in which the
Court declared that individuals enjoyed rights and duties in the European legal
order—and continued with the addition of “economic and social cohesion”25 to the
objectives of the Community in the Single European Act (1986). In 1997, the
Amsterdam Treaty went on to recognize “the place occupied by services of general
economic interest in the shared values of the Union, as well as their role in promoting
social and territorial cohesion.”26 The Constitutional Treaty repeats and strengthens
the commitment to providing public services and promoting social and economic
development.
The path toward “social Europe,” however, has not always been direct or without
obstacles. One area of Community law that runs counter to the political ambition of
providing essential services to all citizens is competition. For instance, vocational
training in many Member States is provided directly by public, state institutions.
Now, under Community law, it appears that vocational training is a service like any
other and must abide by the fair competition principles of public procurement law.27
C. Internal regulation of and external checks on the Commission and other
Community administrative bodies
The third type of administrative functions are those that enable the Community to
accomplish the ultimate ends of regulating the European economy and providing
services and benefits to European citizens. Distributions of the budget within the
administration, management of the civil service system, and procurement of goods
and services for the administration are essential to any government. Contrary to
national governments, the Community is not required to abide by the rules of public
bidding and fair competition set down in European public procurement laws.28
However, this (unfortunate) double-standard is gradually disappearing.
Finally, the advising, checking, and controlling of administrative agencies is
absolutely crucial in Community administrative law. Advice is sought from the
advisory committees established under the Treaties, bodies such as the Economic and
Social Committee, as well as from expert committees established by law for particular
regulatory areas made up of Community officials, officials of national administrations,
independent experts, and representatives of interest groups. While advisory activities
have always been prominent in European administrative law, activities designed to
check and control have acquired importance more recently. Oversight has become
increasingly necessary with the expansion of Community policymaking, the growth of

25. EC Treaty, art. 158.
26. EC Treaty, art. 16.
27. MARIO P. CHITI, supra note 1, at 272.
28. N. Bassi, I contratti e le convenzioni tripartiti di obbiettivi tra Comunità, Stati membri e autorità
regionali e locali: un tentativo di inquadramento sistematico, in RIV. IT. DIR. PUBBL. COM., supra note 12, AT
496.
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the Community budget and public expenditures, and the emerging principle of “good
administration.” For instance, the Court of Auditors, which is responsible for
reviewing Community expenditures at the end of every fiscal year, was officially
recognized as a Community institution in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty. The recent
attention to administrative controls and checks is also in evidence in the new law
setting down in minute detail the procedure for public spending.29
IV
NOVEL ELEMENTS AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF
EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TODAY
A. The “Discovery” of Administrative Proceedings in Community Law
The emergence of various kinds of Community administrative action has run
parallel to the “discovery” of the administrative proceeding as the ordinary mode of
administrative action. Administrative action in the Community system is undertaken
through procedural sequences in which national and supranational regulations
alternately examine the same matter and administer a single administrative decision.30
Originally, neither the Treaties nor Community laws (regulations and directives)
had anything to say about procedure. As a practical matter, most administration was
in the hands of the Member States (that is, indirect administration). Moreover,
national differences in law and legal cultures created an imposing obstacle to
Community action in the area.
The Court of Justice began elaborating a set of more procedural and substantive
principles, applicable to the Commission in all its dealing with individuals and
Member States, in fruitful dialogue with national courts and national legal science.
By now, this historical process has been widely studied.31 It deserves to be mentioned
here for two reasons: the importance of judge-made law as a source of principles for
Community public action; and the early forms of administrative procedure in the case
law of the Court of Justice, at one and the same time the consequence and the cause of
the emergence of European administration. This experience demonstrates that in
novel, supranational, legal systems like the European one, case law seems to be the
natural source of general administrative and constitutional law principles, which then
are partly transposed into written law—that is to say, in the case of Community law,
into treaty amendments, directives, and regulations.
The conversion of judge-made principles into “written” law has accelerated
recently. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, “proclaimed” on

29. Council Regulation 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation Applicable to the General Budget of the
European Communities, 2002 O.J. (L 248) 1; Council Regulation 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 Laying Down
the Statute for Executive Agencies to be Entrusted with Certain Tasks in the Management of Community
Programmes, 2003 O.J. (L 11) 1.
30. SABINO CASSESE, LE BASI DEL DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 307 (4th ed., 2000).
31. In particular by HANS-PETER NEHL, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN EC LAW (1999);
TRIDIMAS, supra note 12; Claudio Franchini, I principi applicabili ai procedimenti amministrativi europei, in
RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO 1037 (2003); see also MARIO P. CHITI, supra note 1.
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the occasion of the European Council of December 2000 in Nice, and now part of the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, contains a number of articles dedicated
to administrative procedure. Secondary Community law—that is, directives and
regulations—have also begun to set down general rules of administrative action, in
some cases by individual policy sectors, 32 and in other cases more broadly, as in the
Financial Regulation on the Community’s general budget.33
The attention that scholars now pay to the administrative dimension of the
Community has led to the rediscovery of similar forms of Community action dating
back to the beginning of the 1960s, at the time unnoticed by scholars, but bearing
significant resemblance to Community administration today.34
The demands of the internal market and the need to overcome the resistance to
compliance in many Member States has driven to some extent the move to include
procedural principles in written law. The most notable example of procedure as a tool
for inducing national compliance with Community law is public procurements: the
national administrative procedure followed in awarding public controls has been
specified in such detail that Member States’ freedom of execution has been virtually
eliminated. Such specification involves precise, self-executing directives, which have
then been consistently interpreted in even its broadest aspects by the Court of Justice
through judgments following preliminary ruling procedures.
Aside from the historical, legal process through which general principles have
been established, European administrative law is very similar to national law and does
not display any unique elements, with the sole exception of the principle of
subsidiarity. That is not to say all principles are common to all national orders. The
principles identified as “general” by the Court of Justice (and, more recently, also the
Court of First Instance) in many cases belonged only to a few national orders. For
instance, the principle of legitimate expectations is a long-standing element of German
law but was almost unknown in many other places until it was adopted in Community
law. The same can be said for the principle of proportionality, which again was

32. See, e.g., Council Regulation 3975/87 EEC of 14 December 1987 Laying Down the Procedure for the
Application of the Rules on Competition to Undertakings in the Air Transport Sector, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1 (air
transportation); Council Regulation 4056/86 EEC of 22 December 1986 Laying Down Detailed Rules for the
Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to Maritime Transport, 1986 O.J. (L 378) 4 (maritime
transportation); Council Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 March 2001
on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council
Directive 90/220/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1.
33. Council Regulation 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation Applicable to the General
Budget of the European Communities, 2002 O.J. (L 248) 1; Council Regulation 58/2003 Laying Down the
Statute for Executive Agencies to be Entrusted with Certain Tasks in the Management of Community
Programmes, art, 2, 2003 O.J. (L 11) 1. See Paul Craig, A New Framework for EU Administration: The
Financial Regulation 2002, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (Winter 2004).
34. Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, Sui limiti dell’autonomia procedimentale e processuale degli Stati
membri nell’applicazione del diritto comunitario, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO 5
(2001), which also refers to Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the Co-ordination of Special
Measures Concerning the Movement and Residence of Foreign Nationals which are Justified on Grounds of
Public Policy, Public Security or Public Health, 1964 O.J. (L56) 850. Cf. Albrecht Weber, Il Diritto
Amministrativo Procedimentale Nell’Ordinamento della Comunità Europea, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO
PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO 393 (2002) (providing many other examples).
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borrowed from German law, even though slightly different incarnations did exist in
other legal systems, including the Italian one.35
B. Features of European Procedural Law
Until recently, Community administrative law borrowed largely from national law
and did not contain any novel elements. Recently, however, principles without
national roots have begun to appear. Such is the case of the precautionary principle.
This principle appeared in Community law for the first time in the Single European
Act, with specific reference to environment protection. Article 174 of the EC Treaty
provides in paragraph 2 that Community action on environmental matters shall be
founded on the principle of preventive action and has since been amplified in the
Maastricht Treaty through express reference to the “precautionary and preventive
action principles.” Even though the text speaks of precaution only in the
environmental area, the precautionary principle was immediately elevated to the rank
of a general principle of Community law, with special relevance for health protection
and consumers’ security. This principle requires that the competent authorities adopt
measures designed to prevent potential risks to public health, security, and
environment, measures under which “the demands connected to the protection of such
interests prevail over the economic interests.”36
The implications of the precautionary principle are manifold. Since it refers not
only to risk but also to uncertainty, it provides the legal basis for sui generis
Community acts in particular situations of necessity and urgency, similar to Italian
“extraordinary administrative orders” (ordinanzemministrative straordinarie), with no
need to wait for the reality and gravity of risk to be fully demonstrated. Further, the
principle limits judicial review, since the European Courts cannot substitute the
technical conclusions of the competent authorities with their own, nonexpert opinion.
A second difference that separates Community law from most national
administrative laws is the treatment of administrative inaction. In several national
legal orders, including the Italian and the Spanish ones, the inertia of public
administration is no longer considered pathological and is now one of the ways in
which an administrative proceeding may conclude. One of the rationales for
permitting administrative agencies not to issue a formal decision is the need for
simplification and economy of administrative action. Nevertheless, judicial review of
such inaction is generally guaranteed through the doctrinal device of “presumed
inaction”: after the expiration of a certain period of time, the agency is presumed not
to have acted and the concerned individual has a statutory right to challenge the
inaction before a court.37 In contrast, Community law is very suspicious of
35. ALDO SANDULLI, LA PROPORZIONALITÀ DELL’AZIONE AMMINISTRATIVO, (1998); DIANA-URANIA
GALETTA, PRINCIPIO DI PROPORZIONALITÀ E SINDACATO GIURISDIZIONALE NEL DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO,
(1998).
36. So, in a very frank way on the nature of the precautionary principle as a principle superior to others
belonging to same constitutional rank. Joined Cases T-74, T-76, T-83, T-85, T-132, T-137, & T-141/00,
Artegodan GmbH v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-4945.
37. See Alberto J. Gil Ibáñez, The “Standard” Administrative Procedure for Supervising and Enforcing
EC Law: EC Treaty Articles 226 and 228, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (Winter 2004) .
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administrative inaction, as demonstrated in three examples from the case law at the
Court of Justice.
In Commission v. Italy,38 Italian legislation implementing the European
groundwater directive was at issue. The Italian legislation allowed the administration
to deny industry applications through “tacit” administrative authorizations, or, in other
words, administrative silence. The Court of Justice interpreted the Community
Directive as prohibiting this administrative technique. According to the Court of
Justice, the Italian arrangement did not allow the parties, the Commission, or the
courts to verify whether the administrative checks required under the groundwater
Directive had been actually carried out; nor did it allow the parties to follow and
monitor the decisionmaking process of the administrative authority, with prejudice to
the interest in legal certainty. On these grounds, the Court interpreted the Directive as
requiring that the refusal, grant, or withdrawal of authorizations take place by way of
an express measure in accordance with precise rules of procedure.
The same conclusion was reached by the Court in two later cases, Commission v.
Germany and Daesang Corp. v. Commission.39 These judgments repeat the finding
that lack of an express measure prevents the parties and the Court from overseeing the
decisionmaking procedure and also state, unconvincingly, that when the public
authority takes no action, individual examination of the application is not guaranteed,
with negative consequences for the public interests involved in the case.
The decisions of the Court of Justice reveal a prejudice toward administrative
silence or inaction, rather than a reasoned, justified disagreement over this legal
doctrine. The European rule against administrative silence frustrates the attempts of
the last decade in Spain, Italy, and elsewhere to simplify and expedite the work of the
bureaucracy.
C. Integration between Community and National Legal Orders
The absence, for the most part, of novel principles of European administrative law
is beneficial because it facilitates the integration of European and national
administrative law. But it also highlights a stage of immaturity of European
administrative law, which as of yet has not produced new principles specifically
designed to address the unique features of Community administrative action.
The familiarity of European administrative law to national scholars, judges, and
administrators is important because of the rise in the implementation of European law
through joint or mixed administration. Because the very same matter is tossed back
and forth between national and Community regulators, it is critical that they work with
the same administrative law concepts and principles. In part, the general principles of
mixed proceedings already exist in the Member State because of the prevalence, in
European law, of borrowing from national law; in part they are gradually and

38. Case C-360/87, Commission v. Italy, 1991. E.C.R. I-791.
39. Case 131/88, Commission v. Germany, 1991 E.C.R. I-825; Case T-230/00, Daesang Corp. v.
Commission, 2003 E.C.R. II-2733.
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incrementally established by the European Court of Justice. This, as it turns out, is
quite healthy for achieving the various ends of Community administration.
At the same time, the lack of innovation has left two new, and problematic,
features of the European system of mixed administration untouched: the involvement
of both national and European authorities in different procedural sequences depending
on the policy area,40 and the insignificance of the final act compared to the decisions
leading up to the final act as the matter is passed back and forth between national and
European regulators. The two problems are tightly connected, since the participation
in the same proceeding of different administrative authorities—Community, national,
“infranational”41—compromises procedural unity as well as any relevant legal
differences between the final determination and the interim decisions leading up to the
determination.
D. Composite Proceedings and the Crisis of the Principle of Procedural Autonomy
The rise of mixed proceedings chronicled in this Article is one of the principal
causes of the crisis in national procedural autonomy—until recently one of the core
legal principles governing the relations between the Community and the Member
States and rooted in the old, disappearing system of indirect administration. 42
Legal science has questioned the existence and the effective reach of the principle
of procedural autonomy for a long time.43 Not only has procedural autonomy been
eroded by the growth of mixed administration, but even in those areas still left to
national discretion and indirect implementation, the public interest of uniform law
throughout the Community and the citizen’s interest in equality have limited the scope
of the principle.
The Court has long adopted a flexible approach to national administrative
procedure.44 It has established two important principles for evaluating whether
national procedure effectively allows citizens to vindicate their Community rights: the
principles of equivalence (or non-discrimination) and of effectiveness. Equivalence
means that the procedural opportunities for individuals to invoke their Community
rights should be no less favourable than those through which they may invoke their
rights arising under national law. As for effectiveness, national procedural
40. See Giacinto della Cananea, The European Union’s Mixed Administrative Proceedings, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP PROBS. 197 (Winter 2004).
41. This refers to various committees in which national regulators hammer out their differences. See id. at
215; Edoardo Chiti, Administrative Proceedings Involving European Agencies, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
219 (Winter 2004).
42. See Rodriguez Iglesias, supra note 34, at 6.
43. For a synthesis see A. GARCIA URETA, PROCEDIMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO Y DERECHO COMUNITARIO
(2002).
44. See Case 33/76, Rewe v. Landwirtschaftskammer fur as Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989. Analogously, for
procedural law, see Case 199/82, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. San Giorgio, 1983 E.C.R. 3595.
The same position can be found also in the Community secondary law, such as Council Regulation 2988/95 of
18 December 1995 on the Protection of the European Communities Financial Interests, 1995 O.J. (L 312) 1. In
particular, article 2.2 provides that, subject to the Community law applicable, the procedures for the application
of Community checks, measures and penalties shall be governed by the laws of the Member States. In the legal
science, C. Kakuris, Do the Member States still possess Judicial Procedural Autonomy?, in C.M.L.R. 1398
(1997).
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requirements may not make it excessively difficult or impossible in practice to
exercise the rights granted under Community law.
Not only is national administrative procedure subject to the Community
requirements of equivalence and effectiveness, but it has increasingly come under the
spell of specific conditions set down by Community legislation. This proliferation of
written, statutory procedural law has three consequences: the “Europeanization” of
national administrations, which come to operate as a single administration or
executive power of the European order; the strong vertical integration between
national administrations and Community bodies, and horizontal integration among the
administrations of the Member States; the creation of new general principles of
European procedural law.
One prominent example of this recent trend is EC Council Regulation n.
1334/2000, of 22 June 2000, setting up a Community regime for the control of exports
of dual-use items and technology. Dual-use items are products that can be used for
both civil and military purposes and that are subject to regulatory control upon export
from the Community, in order to ensure that the Community complies with its
international commitments in the field of non-proliferation.
To establish effective export controls, the Community has established a common
administrative system for enforcement and monitoring in all Member States. From
the standpoint of the internal market objectives of free trade among the Member States
also guarantees the free movement of dual-use items inside the Community. Under
Regulation n. 1334/2000 an exporter of dual-use items must obtain an administrative
authorization, granted either by the Commission or by the responsible authority in the
Member State of the exporter’s place of establishment, depending on the
circumstances. The Regulation sets down the authorization procedure, including an
authorization application form, to be used by all the Member State authorities. Article
8 provides that, in deciding on export authorization, the Member States shall take into
account all relevant considerations, including their commitments under international
law. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the competent authorities “may refuse to
grant an export authorization and may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an export
authorization which they have already granted,” and they are required to inform the
competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission.
The Regulation not only imposes vertical coordination by setting down a single
authorization procedure to be used in all Member States, but also fosters horizontal
coordination. For instance, before any Member State authorizes export of a
technology that had previously been denied authorization by another Member State
within the previous three years, it must first consult the Member State that denied
authorization.45 If, following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to
go ahead and authorize the technology, it must inform the other Member States and
the Commission, providing all relevant information supporting its decision.
The Regulation on dual-use technology highlights once again the Community
legislator’s skepticism of administrative silence or inaction. The Regulation does not

45. See TREATY, supra note 2, at art. 9, para. 3.
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anticipate administrative silence, and indeed the whole procedure is geared toward
producing an express authorization or denial of authorization based on the facts of the
case. For example, article 6, paragraph 2 allows authorities to condition authorization
on certain guarantees to be provided by the exporter, such as an end-use statement.46
Another very recent example of the minute Community regulation of national
procedure is the Council Regulation on the Financial Regulation applicable to the
general budget of the European Communities.47 Of the numerous provisions relevant
to this discussion, those concerning the methods of implementing the budget provide
the best evidence of the various forms of administrative integration between the
Commission and other government bodies, within or outside the Community.48 The
Commission can execute the budget through one of three procedures: “centralized”
management; “shared” or “decentralized” management; or joint management with
international organizations.
The “centralized” system, concentrated in the
Commission, is quite peculiar. It can occur in one of four ways: (1) directly by the
Commission; (2) indirectly by a new form of “executive agency” (which should not be
confused with standard European agencies such as the Medicinal and Trademark
agencies), created by a separate Council Regulation;49 (3) indirectly through the
“bodies set up by the Community;”50 or (4) indirectly through “national public-sector
bodies or bodies governed by private law with a public service mission providing
adequate financial guarantees.”51
In the case of “shared management,”
implementation is delegated to the Member States. In the case of “decentralised
management,” implementation is delegated to third countries. In these two forms of
administration, however, the Commission retains significant decisionmaking
responsibility.52 The fourth and last model entrusts the Commission with final
responsibility for implementation of the budget in all cases. It states, “the
Commission shall implement the budget . . . on its own responsibility and within the
limits of the appropriations, having regard to the principles of sound financial
management,” under “joint management with international organizations,” subject to
particular conditions.
Notwithstanding the variety of the models of budget administration, the
Regulation provides a single body of rules and procedures to ensure overall
coherency, and entrusts final responsibility for most budget decisions to the
Commission. In particular, it prohibits the Commission from delegating powers to
third parties when these powers involve a large measure of discretion and entail

46. Id. at art. 6, para. 2.
47. Council Regulation 1605/2002, supra note 33.
48. See Craig, supra note 33, at 110-133.
49. Council Regulation 58/2003, supra note 33.
50. These bodies are referred to in Council Regulation 1605/2002, supra note 33, at art. 185, as have legal
personality and actually receiving grants charged to the budget.
51. See Craig, supra note 34, at 119-120.
52. For example, it has the power to take final responsibility in budget execution, in pursuance of Article
274 of the EC Treaty.
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political choices. The Commission must clearly define the tasks being delegated and
fully supervise their execution.53
E. New Features of Judicial Review
Administrative acts that result from Community administrative proceedings—that
is, proceedings designed to implement Community law—are subject to general
requirements of Community law that are becoming progressively differentiated from
those of national legal systems.54 This widening gap between Community and
national law is particularly apparent in the domain of the grounds upon which
administrative acts can be declared void: the grounds of judicial review. Article 230
of the EC Treaty lists lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement, infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application,
and misuse of powers as the grounds of review of Community legal acts. It appears
that the drafters did not anticipate that the French-inspired ground of misuse of powers
(detournement de pouvoir or sviamento di potere) would be invoked frequently by
litigants; and yet, today, this ground has spawned a prodigious jurisprudence on
misuse of powers.55 Under Community law, the Commission or other deciding
institution is deemed to have misused its powers when it does so to achieve goals
other than those provided by the law and officially declared by the deciding
institution; or to evade procedures specifically prescribed by the Treaty. To establish
misuse of powers, the litigant must put forward significant and consistent evidence
that the Community institution acted for reasons other than the stated ones.56 In the
Italian case, by contrast, the understanding of “misuse of power” is broader and
applied to a far wider array of situations.57
Italian and Community law also diverge on the judicial techniques for holding
administrative acts in violation of Community law, an issue that has implications for
the timing of review, the application of statutes of limitation on bringing challenges,
and the retroactive application of judgments striking administrative decisions.58
Italian courts have established two types of invalidity: one, when the national
administrative act comes into conflict with Italian law or administrative rules
implementing Community law or with Community law itself; and one when the
national administrative act implements a national provision that itself conflicts with
Community law. According to the Italian Consiglio di Stato (the highest court with
jurisdiction over administrative law cases), the first comes under the ordinary regime
53. Council Regulation 1605/2002, supra note 33, at art. 54.
54. The theme is widely dealt with in ARZOZ SANTISTEBAN, CONCEPTO Y REGIMEN JURIDICO DEL ACTO
ADMINISTRATIVO COMUNITARIO (1998).
55. A. Garcia Ureta, Misuse of Powers as a Ground for the Annulment of Community Acts: A Case
Approach, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO 775 (2003).
56. Among the various judgments, Case C-248/89, Cargill Bvv. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-2987; and
Case T-247/01, eCopy, Inc. v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Mark and Design), 2002
E.C.R. II-5301.
57. Roberto Caranta, La giustizia amministrativa comunitaria, in 5 TRATTATO DI DIRITTO
AMMINISTRATIVO, DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO SPECIALE 4954 (Sabino Cassesse ed., 2d ed. 2003).
58. Mario P. Chiti, L’invalidità degli atti amministrativi per violazione di disposizioni comunitarie e il
relativo regime processuale, in DIRITTO AMM. 645 (2003).
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for finding administrative acts in violation of higher law, the only difference being
that the law is Community rather than national; or, in other words, as a technical
matter, the judge will find the act illegitimate (illegittimità or annullabilità). This
means that litigants must challenge such administrative acts within certain statutory
time limits or else find the action to be time-barred. Furthermore, a judicial decision
of illegitimacy does not have retroactive effect, meaning that individuals not party to
the suit who have already complied are not entitled to seek compensation or other
forms of remedy. In the second case, the judge will instead find the act to be void or
non-existent (nullo or inesistente), since it was based on a national provision that itself
was found unlawful because it was incompatible with Community law, and hence
incapable of conferring any administrative power. An administrative act can always
be challenged on such grounds, and because the consequence is to find the act void or
nonexistent, even individuals who were not party to the case and who were somehow
adversely affected before the case came down benefit from the decision.
Whether this regime is lawful under Community law and complies with the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness is an open question. Italian courts
maintain that the current scheme is not discriminatory and does not make it impossible
or excessively difficult to vindicate Community rights against Italian administrative
decisions. When the litigants find themselves time-barred in the case of possibly
illegitimate acts, they are advised to resort to the traditional tools of national law, such
as the doctrine of excusable mistake.
The Court of Justice set down the standard for national remedies against unlawful
administrative acts in Santex Spa,59 revising somewhat a position announced in an
earlier line of cases. National rules establishing statutes of limitation for bringing
challenges to administrative decision are lawful as long as they satisfy the requirement
of effectiveness, or, in other words, so long as such statutes of limitation do not make
the exercise of rights recognized by Community law virtually impossible or
excessively difficult and do not breach the requirement of non-discrimination. In
Santex Spa, the Court held that the Italian sixty-day statute of limitations period for
bringing challenges to a notice of an invitation to tender satisfied both conditions.
The decision of the Court, however, rested on the specific experience with the
particular procedural requirement and left open the possibility that, in another set of
circumstances, the application of the statute of limitations might breach the principles
of effectiveness or non-discrimination, in which case the Italian court would be under
a duty to disregard (disapply or disapplicazione) the Italian statute of limitations to
apply Community law and protect the rights conferred thereunder on individuals.
The holding of the Court of Justice might appear minimalist, but the contrast with
the jurisprudence of the Italian Consiglio di Stato is clear. The duty to disregard,
under certain circumstances, statutes of limitation to bring challenges to
administrative decisions goes further than the excuses available at the national level to
litigants who otherwise would be time-barred from going to court.60
59. Case C-327/00, Santex Spa v. Unità Socio Sanitaria Locale n. 42 di Pavia, 2003 E.C.R. I-1877.
60. Not all of the rule changes imposed by the Court of Justice, however, appear justified For instance, the
Court requires that ante causam interim protection, or preliminary injunctive relief, always be available in
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Consequences for the Rights of the Parties

The influence of Community law on administrative procedure inevitably affects
the rights of the parties who come before administrative agencies and the courts.
When implementation was fully in the hands of the Member States, individual rights
were left entirely to national law. National autonomy over rights paralleled national
autonomy over the organization of administrative and judicial systems. Early on,
however, the freedom of the Member States to set rules of procedure for their judicial
systems began to disappear because of the prejudice to Community rights that was
resulting from national differences in civil procedure. Today, procedural autonomy
over the administrative arena is also beginning to fade.
The consequences of the Europeanization of administrative proceedings for
individual rights are potentially grave. In Community proceedings, the decisions that
are made by various administrative authorities as they pass the same matter back and
forth and that precede the final, legally binding decision are more important than the
equivalent decisions in purely national proceedings. This is because different
government bodies, with different civil servants and administrative ties, participate at
various phases and because a conclusive assessment of the particular facts and policy
issues may very well be made at a preliminary phase by the administrative body best
situated to make such determinations rather than by the administrative agency that
issues the final, formal decision. Thus the traditional distinction in Italian law
between procedural acts—those considered ancillary to final agency acts61 and that
give rise to no right or duties inhering in the parties—and final acts,62 with which the
parties have a duty to comply63 and against which the parties may vindicate their
rights in court, is problematic. Often the rights of the parties are compromised by a
determination made during the Italian phase of a proceeding, even though the final
decision rests with the Community institution (generally the Commission); yet the
parties are barred from going to Italian court and challenging what is considered an
ancillary, non-final administrative determination. When the parties then attempt to
challenge the final decision (formally issued by the Commission) in the European
courts, they are denied standing because the Commission’s decision is believed not to
“directly” affect the parties; the decision that did “directly” affect the parties was
supposedly the Italian one.64
national court proceedings challenging a national administrative act as violating Community law. Yet the
Italian judicial system guarantees interim protection against administrative decisions in other equally effective
ways. See Case C-214/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. I-4667 considering such a remedy as inherent,
imposing it to the laws of the Member States).
61. In Italian, this is called “atto privo di rilievoe esterno” or “act without external effect.”
62. The Italian term is “provvedimento.”
63. The Italian term is “atto a rilievo esterno, con contenuto imperativo,” or “act with external relevance
and imperative content.”
64. See for instance the case of genetically modified products, decided by the Court of Justice in
judgement 21.3.2000, case C-6/99, effectively commented by Roberto Caranta, Coordinamento e divisione dei
compiti tra Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee e giudici nazionali nelle ipotesi di coamministrazione: il
caso dei prodotti geneticamente modificati, in RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO 1133
(2000).
To have standing before the European courts, the individual must be “directly and individually affects” by
the Community measure. See EC TREATY, art. 230.
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In this respect, a genuine “jurisdiction issue” is emerging in the European Union,
which is reminiscent of problems faced by the Italian government immediately after
Italian unification in the nineteenth century and which was solved by legislation.65 The
Court of Justice does not yet decide jurisdictional conflicts, except indirectly through
preliminary references. Instead, national courts decide the issue, even when
Community rights are involved, and, paradoxically, without the same guarantees
offered by the national system for purely internal administrative decisions.
Because the European Courts can take up to two years to decide the standing
question, when the parties return to national court to challenge the (now final)
administrative decision, they can find themselves time-barred under national statutes
of limitations.66 Or, if the proceeding concludes with a final decision by an Italian
administrative agency (so that the doctrine of final agency action poses no bar to
access to the courts), the national court may not adequately scrutinize the decision
because it appears to be so influenced by Community law—and by the ancillary, nonfinal determinations of the Commission—that review would be better left to the
European Courts.
V
CONCLUSION: THE CURRENT LIMITS OF EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Genuine innovation in European administrative law is rare. Most of the principles
worked out by the European Courts find their origins in one or more national systems
of administrative law. Yet the multi-level structure of administrative governance is
new, unlike anything to be found in federal systems like Germany, or in systems with
strong regional and local autonomy, like Italy.
What is lacking in Community administrative law, therefore, is a complex of
original principles similar to those worked out for the “constitutional” dimension of
the Community legal order, principles such as supremacy of Community law, direct
effect, and Member State liability for breaches of Community law. Thus, the task
awaiting scholars is the creation of new principles appropriate to the administrative
law of European integration.

65. Law n. 2832 of 1877.
66. See, e.g., Case C-97/91, Oleificio Borelli Spa v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-215.
comprehensive discussion of Oleificio Borelli see della Cananea, supra note 40.
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